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Policy decisions about the UK railway industry often draw on models and frameworks that treat technology
and organisational processes as static and unchanging. As a result, policy makers often have limited understanding
of how changes in policy will influence organisational knowledge, learning and the allocation of risk that
subsequently affects innovation and system development. This paper applies a business model lens, focused on the
mechanisms firms use to create and capture value, to connect policy decisions to subsequent changes in the
organisation and industrial structure of the UK railway sector. By analysing innovation-related activity across several
different governance structures, the paper highlights how policy impacts in network-based infrastructure sectors
are mediated by business strategy, sometimes leading to unintended outcomes. The findings suggest that policy
to improve the performance should focus upon coordination rather than just ownership. The application of a business
model approach to complement existing economic and policy models in system analysis for policy decisions
is advocated.
1. Introduction
Among the reasons given for the privatisation of British Rail
(the nationalised organisation that owned and operated the
mainline railway from 1962 until privatisation) was the asser-
tion that a change in ownership and governance would lead to
improved operational efficiency, superior planning and pressure
for more effective capital investment and innovation (DoT,
1992; Jupe and Crompton, 2006). Despite this, the privatised
railway industry in the UK has been criticised for producing
an expensive, uncoordinated, un-innovative industry that
required substantial public subsidy and was more concerned
with corporate profits than traveller welfare and safety (e.g.
Bowman et al., 2013; Wolmar, 2001). Taking innovation as the
means through which the form and performance of a railway
system change, this paper uses a business model lens to
examine innovation-related activity in the post-privatisation
UK railway industry in order to understand changes in system
development.
Privatisation was initiated and implemented externally by pol-
itical actors outside the railway industry. Despite an expressed
interest in innovation (DoT, 1992), decisions over the industry’s
structure were driven by a concern about the operational
coordination of the network under private competition. How
the railway system was going to develop, where innovation
would come from and what it would change were all left uncer-
tain. The railway system was now operated through private
firms and its subsequent development was principally governed
by their intersecting interests and activities. By exploring the
changing business models of these firms, this paper helps
explain their innovation-related activities.
Prior to privatisation, the nationalised British Rail was con-
sidered to be a declining and costly legacy industry that was
losing market share to road transportation (Bradshaw, 1997;
Pollitt and Smith, 2002). However, since privatisation, rather
than declining further, demand for rail travel has grown (Preston
and Robins, 2013; Tyrrall, 2004). The governance structure has
continued to change in response to a series of accidents and
numerous safety, investment and management problems, many
of which can be linked to challenges in coordination. As a
result, the initially deregulated privatised sector has become
increasingly regulated and parts have been taken back into
public ownership (Glaister, 2004; Murray, 2005).
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Recently, attempts have been made to address the innovation
deficit within the industry by encouraging innovative change
(Lovell et al., 2011; Palacin et al., 2015); examples include
initiation of the Rail Technical Strategy (DfT, 2007), the
‘unlocking innovation’ scheme run by the Railway Industry
Association and Innovate UK, and Crossrail’s innovation strat-
egy (DeBarro et al., 2015). One reason why technological
developments do not appear to have been given much con-
sideration within the original privatisation is that the policy
and economic models used to design the industrial structure
that would be launched, and to analyse the industry since,
have limited ability to capture innovation. The models used in
public economics – and particularly the models developed for
the regulation of networked industries that are subject to
numerous market failures – tend to treat technical change as
an investment decision about exogenously developed process
technology, rather than a cumulative process of capability
development that is endogenously generated within firms. The
economic models used to understand innovation, on the other
hand, typically focus on competitive industries. These indus-
tries differ in important regards from the railways, which are
capital-intensive, networked natural monopolies that provide a
combination of difficult-to-substitute essential travel services
and (sometimes commercially unviable) public goods. Given the
power of economic models to help generate policy frameworks
that enable the management of monopoly service provision in
networked industries – and particularly their power in helping
design contracts – the lack of attention to innovation can seem
a minor issue. However, the post-privatisation experience of the
railway sector suggests that it is a gap that is important.
Business models offer an alternative, complementary way of
understanding dynamic changes in a firm, industry or sector
(Baden Fuller and Morgan, 2010; Teece, 2010). In this case,
business models offer a means of representing and analysing
the interests and agency of the private firms that were re-
introduced with the restructuring and privatisation of the
sector. A business model is a simplified representation of a
firm that captures how it (a) creates value and (b) captures
value (Baden Fuller and Morgan, 2010; Teece, 2010).
Economists have long recognised the importance of innovation
in changing market structures, but have tended to see inno-
vation in terms of the creation of value. As shown by the
example of EMI’s successful development – and unsuccessful
commercialisation – of the computerised axial tomography
(CAT) scanner, creating value is not enough for innovative
success (Teece, 1986). Firms also need to be able to capture
some of the value they create and turn it into profit.
The business model approach used here to analyse innovation
activity in the privatised railway industry highlights that a
system-level incentive is not sufficient for action where coordi-
nation between different actors is difficult. By considering both
the creation and capture of value for the private sector, the
study presented in the next section of this paper shows the
connection between the structural changes following privatisa-
tion and the changing interests and coordination for inno-
vation that were missed in the models that informed the initial
privatisation process. While only an illustration of this
approach, it does show how policy actors assessing or altering
the organisational structure of infrastructure sectors can use
considerations of how firms capture value to examine sub-
sequent system development opportunities and, in doing so,
identify and remove potential obstacles or undesirable develop-
ment interests.
2. The study: changes in development
activity across railway privatisation
To illustrate how a focus on business models can illuminate the
industrial dynamic of the UK railway sector after privatisation,
this study explores a historical account of the UK railway
sector based on interview data, primary material and data
on innovative activity taken from reports in the specialist
industrial press. These provide information on the structural
changes following privatisation and related changes in innova-
tive activity. The analysis focuses on connecting changes in
innovation activity to the structural changes in the industry
that altered value flows within the sector, and hence how value
was created and captured.
Section 2.1 discusses value creation and capture in the early
days of Great Britain’s railway system, a time when it was oper-
ated and developed by private organisations prior to nationali-
sation and the creation of British Rail after World War II.
Section 2.2 describes the changing organisational structures
that came with railway privatisation and some further adjust-
ments made by policy actors following privatisation that
changed institutions, organisations and the type of knowledge
within the industry. Section 2.3 outlines the methods used to
analyse changing innovation activity within the sector and
describes changes in innovation activity in two areas: delay
penalties and possession costs, and gathering information on
the network. The former are linked to changes in opportunities
to capture value that alter value creation activity while the
latter features a new area of value that generated a response
within the industry to find new ways to create and capture
value. Section 2.4 discusses how a business model approach
generates additional insights that complement existing policy
and economic models for analysing the dramatic changes that
came with privatisation in this industry.
2.1 Organisational structures in the private railway
industry pre-nationalisation
Railways are a classic example of an infrastructure sector. The
core infrastructure sectors of energy, water and waste, transport
and telecommunications share three central features. First,
they are based on the provision of essential services through
capital-intensive, large technical systems or networks. Second,
these large technical systems are subject to a range of market
failures, typically either as natural monopolies where
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competition is reduced and consumers can be exploited, or as
public goods that provide services that cannot be effectively
provided by the market. Large technical systems also typically
generate a range of significant positive and negative external-
ities that complicate market provision and make their govern-
ance inherently political (Bozeman, 2007). Third, because of
these multiple market failures, infrastructure industries are
typically heavily regulated, with a variety of forms of regu-
lation covering their ownership, operation and funding. Many
require some form of subsidy for their public good features,
with taxation complementing charges and/or license fees. They
also often need oversight to solve the range of strategic coordi-
nation problems caused by their complex technical inter-
dependencies. The resulting regulations tend to differ by
country and change over time because the relationships
between the underlying technology of technological systems,
their associated market failures and governance solutions are
unstable and dynamic.
These dynamic interactions can be seen in the history of the
British railway system. In their early years, railways were
governed as 21-year franchises, paying a 10% dividend, with
specified rates (Stern, 2003). This structure was based on pre-
vious British experience with toll roads, and did not take into
account the potential of railways to generate monopoly profits.
The resulting monopoly profits, in a period of declining costs,
led to the railway mania of the 1840s and the resulting rapid
expansion of the British railway system (Stern, 2003).
As the railway system grew and started to be integrated,
coordination and standardisation became more important.
Standards such as the Stephenson gauge (1846–1892) (Johnson
and Long, 1981) needed to be negotiated and enforced.
Unfortunately, the uncoordinated early expansion led to a frag-
mented low-performance system with carriers exploiting their
customers. The typical business model involved protecting a
firm’s monopoly profits by deterring market entry from com-
petitors. This was done through threats of rates war, revenue
sharing, price collusion, mergers, vertical integration to reduce
competition (e.g. using monopoly profits to buy canal and
dock companies) and predatory pricing on customers who
lacked alternative carriers (Stern, 2003). Firms were able to
capture significant value, and grew, but in so doing generated
an inefficient, poorly coordinated, high-cost and high-price
railway system (Casson, 2009). These problems were addressed
by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854, which enforced
effective interchanges and fair pricing (Stern, 2003).
However, success was short-lived. From around 1890, petrol-
powered road transport increasingly provided competition for
traffic, costs started to increase for the first time and profits
were cut by inflation. Firms were unable to pass these new
costs onto their customers because their prices were regulated.
As a result, profits, dividends and share prices fell sharply
in the first decade of the twentieth century (Cain, 1972;
Stern, 2003). Since firms’ monopoly positions were now eroded,
increased rates led to traffic transferring to the road network,
and not – as had previously been the case – increased income.
The resulting economic mess had to be nationalised during
World War I (1914–1918), setting the scene for the 1923 amal-
gamation of 123 private railways into the ‘big four’. However,
problems continued and on New Year’s Day 1948 the newly
created British Transport Commission brought the ‘big four’
private railways into public ownership (Allen, 1982). The pro-
blematic operation of the industry led to the Beeching report
in 1963 (Beeching, 1963) and the subsequent extensive restruc-
turing of the network around major trunk routes and
reduction in its size. It was initially intended that the railways
would be self-sufficient and self-funding, but the Transport
Act 1968 introduced subsidies for the provision of unprofitable,
socially beneficial services (Allen, 1982). Over time, the costs
of these subsidies grew. One motivation for privatisation was
to reduce this increasingly costly subsidy (Harris and
Godward, 1997: pp. 63–64).
In addition to showing the importance of coordination
between private organisations, this historical background high-
lights the role of organisational and political actors and inter-
ests in directing and altering the railway system. Likewise, the
analysis of development activity following privatisation pre-
sented in the following section shows that, although perhaps
unintended, restructuring of the sector and privatisation in the
mid-1990s adjusted the technology of, and possibilities for, the
future form of the railway system.
2.2 Analysis of changing structures over privatisation
The decision, in 1992, to privatise the industry and the sub-
sequent structural alterations were externally imposed rather
than internally generated by actors working within the existing
system (for a contrast see the work of Hughes (1987) on how
an overarching infrastructure systems-goal can generate shared
motivations towards change). These external interventions
altered the system’s structure, and therefore the location and
types of interactions needed for the system to operate effec-
tively. Within an integrated organisational structure, tensions
between where value was created and captured would have
limited influence on innovative activity. Innovation was guided
by a system-wide idea of value, and a focus upon value
creation – without attention to value capture – was sufficient.
The privatisation and restructuring of British Rail between
1992 and 1997 saw the organisation divided both vertically
and, introducing competition, horizontally. The operation of
railway services was to be offered by way of regional franchises,
let for 7–12 years through a process of competitive tender.
The infrastructure came into the ownership of a single private
organisation, Railtrack. However, Railtrack was set up to be
an owning and contract-holding organisation, not one focusing
on technological capabilities (Gourvish, 2002: p. 402), and it
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purchased infrastructure maintenance and renewal services
from contractor organisations also set up from within British
Rail. Mechanisms for coordination between the different
organisations (such as track access charging), as well as prin-
ciples and organisations for regulation, were set up as part of
privatisation. From the decision to privatise in 1992, the
decisions over the industry structure, the reorganisation of
British Rail and the launch of these new organisations into the
private sector took just 5 years.
The launch of the privatised industry in 1997 was followed by
further externally initiated structural changes to adjust differ-
ent elements of system behaviour. Langley (1999) highlights
how these different external interventions can be used to divide
and bound periods of railway system operation and develop-
ment, with the periods between interventions capturing differ-
ent phases of system operation. These, in turn, provide cases of
the railway system operating in different ways, represented in
Figure 1 and described in Table 1.
As shown in the previous section, railway systems change over
time. These changes can come from either internally generated
adjustments to organisational boundaries as actors attempt to
improve overall system performance, or from external interven-
tions. The restructuring of the railway industry at privatisation
and the organisational changes introduced in 2001 changed
the location and form of the boundaries between the organis-
ations that operated and developed the railway. A simplified
representation of value flows within infrastructure delivery is
shown in Figures 2 and 3. Such changes in organisational
boundaries can change how people and processes interact at
those boundaries, what gets delivered between organisations
(or divisions within British Rail before privatisation), the form
and location of the transactions, and their costs and benefits. For
example, a move from operating both vehicles and infrastructure
within the same business unit (as existed before privatisation,
after the ‘Organising for Quality’ (OfQ) restructuring) to a
situation where infrastructure delivery and vehicle operation
are defined and costed in ‘track access’ agreements changes the
infrastructure delivery organisation’s requirements, rewards and
priorities.
In the next section, the impact of privatisation and other exter-
nally generated structural changes on the development of the
railway is considered using business models to explore
& how changes in organisational boundaries lead to changes
in what is considered valuable
& the movement, removal or entry of the knowledge bases
needed to create value
& the mechanisms available to capture value.
2.3 Changes in development activity
To explore changes in development activity, this study used his-
torical accounts, 23 interviews with senior engineers and engin-
eering managers in the railway sector conducted between 2007
and 2009 (see also Lovell et al. (2011)) and secondary data to
analyse changes in how value is created and captured after
structural changes in the industry. The analysis focuses on
three sub-samples of development activities. The interviews
investigated the innovation processes present in the sector and
explored how the industry developed before and after privatisa-
tion. The interviews lasted for 60–90 min. Sensitivities in the
industry at that time meant that interview records were hand-
written and then typed up as notes (rather than recorded and
transcribed). The interview records were sent to interviewees
for comment and validation.
To capture development activity before, during and after privati-
sation, the study focused on railway infrastructure development
British
Rail 
Pre-
privatisation
Sale of subsidiary
businesses 
Decision to
privatise 
Launch of
new 
organisations 
Creation of SRA;
Railtrack into
administration  
SRA to DfT; new
role for 
Network Rail
1989 1992 1997 2001 2005
Newly
privatised 
Network
Rail and SRA 
Privatisation
Figure 1. Phases of system operation identified in this paper as a
timeline
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(specifically problems identified in infrastructure performance
and projects set up to improve it) and sampled activity over
three 12-month periods drawing on the specialist industry
publication Modern Railways. This generated samples of (228,
293 and 377) innovation initiatives for each of the three
periods. The sample phases are described in Table 2 and
Figure 4 shows their position within the historical periods
described in Table 1. The themes found in the analysis of
development activity were investigated further, using inter-
views, secondary and industry publications, and extended into
Phase System form Dates Phase description and start and finish
1 Pre-privatisation system 1989–1992 The sale of British Rail’s subsidiary businesses provides the railway system
that will be privatised in 1992. The most relevant sales are completed in
1989. During this phase the British Rail Board is directing the system
2 Privatisation 1992–1997 Privatisation was initiated in the 1992 Conservative party manifesto and
developed in the white paper that followed and the Railways Act 1993.
Plans for the privatised industry were developed alongside the continued
operation of the existing system. Shadow organisations were set up
within British Rail, and were subsequently privatised between 1993 and
1997
3 Newly privatised 1996–2001 From 1996, market interactions were increasingly used to coordinate the
industry. Three serious accidents occurred between 1997 and 2001. In
2001, the railway system was altered again with the creation of the
Strategic Rail Authority (SRA). The SRA took a strategic overview of the
railway system and took over franchising. Shortly after the launch of the
SRA, Railtrack was placed in administration
4 Network Rail and SRA 2001–2005 The SRA maintained a system overview between 2001 and 2005, while
Network Rail was created to take over infrastructure management. The
Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) and Rail Safety and Standards
Board (RSSB) were set up. In 2005, the SRA was abolished and many of
its functions were taken on by the Department for Transport (DfT)
Table 1. Phases of system operation and development 1989–
2005. The phase boundaries are marked by structural changes
outside the control of railway system actors. The phases represent
different ways of operating and developing the railway system
Train operating 
companies (TOCs) 
and freight operators 
Rail Regulator
Contracts
Railtrack
Access agreements
Office of Passenger
Rail Franchising 
(OPRAF) 
Infrastructure
maintenance
companies (IMCs)
Track renewal
companies
(TRCs)
Figure 2. Value flows in the organisational structure for
infrastructure delivery between 1997 and 2001
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the fourth phase of system operation outlined in Table 1 (i.e.
2001–2005, Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and Network
Rail).
After privatisation, several adjustments to the railway system’s
organisational structure, processes and focus of innovative
activity can be traced back to changes in value creation and
capture. Two are now discussed in more detail. The first –
delay penalties and possession costs – changed value creation
and created new opportunities for value capture. The second –
gathering information on the network – generated a new way
of creating and capturing value.
2.3.1 Delay penalties and cost of possessions
A number of new development activities emerged after privati-
sation related to punctuality, improving maintenance processes
and avoiding delays – areas not heavily represented in earlier
periods. The changing focus is illustrated in Figure 5, which
shows projects focused on advancing system-wide knowledge
(rather than the local implementation of knowledge that had
been developed elsewhere). Punctuality was also a target area
for British Rail, so new innovation in this area was not a
response to a performance characteristic that was newly valu-
able post-privatisation. The innovation activity for reducing
delay and possession time in the post-privatisation phase
shows a variety of developments in different areas of technol-
ogy and involving a range of actors, suggesting this is not just
intense activity in one place but a range of new responses to a,
now monetised, area of performance.
Extending the data analysis to include local installation pro-
jects, in addition to activity advancing system-level knowledge,
shows a series of developments in high-output maintenance
equipment. According to Dow (2014), tampers were intro-
duced onto the network before 1960 and Gourvish (2002:
p. 213) refers to this kind of maintenance equipment being
purchased in the 1980s. This suggests the change in focus does
not reflect a new ability to access or combine knowledge bases.
Network Rail
Maintenance
Track renewal
companies 
(TRCs)
Train operating
companies (TOCs)
and freight operators  
Office of Rail
Regulation (ORR) 
Strategic Rail Authority
(SRA) 
Access agreements
Contracts
Figure 3. Value flows in the organisational structure for
infrastructure delivery between 2001 and 2005
Within phase Time period Focus of analysis
1: Pre-privatisation January to December 1990 Development processes under British Rail, before the privatisation
plan was set out. Data collection ended just before the new
‘Organising for Quality’ (OfQ) initiative was implemented
2: Privatisation June 1992 to July 1993 Development processes before structural changes had begun but
after the decision to privatise had been announced
3: Post-privatisation October 1998 to September 1999 Development following privatisation and restructuring. This data
sample concluded just before the Ladbroke Grove accident
(5 October 1999), the second of the series of rail accidents that
influenced subsequent restructuring decisions
Table 2. Summary of data
6
Transport Business models in rail infrastructure:
explaining innovation
Lovell and Nightingale
Offprint provided courtesy of www.icevirtuallibrary.com
Author copy for personal use, not for distribution
Instead, more machines were required after the organisational
structures were changed. However, looking across the range of
maintenance- and punctuality-focused projects in the 1998 data
sample, they include Balfour Beatty and Railtrack improving
coordination and renewal planning, the development of an
ultrasonic rail-flaw detection cart, a computer-based mainten-
ance estimating system and work on a new metallurgical make-
up of crossings to improve wear. This variety and, in some
cases, high degree of novelty indicates development in this area
goes beyond simple renewal or roll-out of existing equipment.
Interviewees highlighted the importance of reliability in
driving technology development for vehicles and operations
as well as infrastructure in the post-privatisation railway.
The privatisation process led to the creation of delay penalties
to reduce the financial losses suffered by parties delayed by
others. The Rail Regulator was given responsibility for allocat-
ing blame for delay-minutes accrued on the network and com-
panies were required to pay penalties to one another
accordingly. Similarly, the infrastructure operator also has to
compensate train operators for times when the infrastructure is
unavailable. This puts a commercial value on the number and
length of infrastructure possessions.
These mechanisms – delay penalties and possession charging –
generated new opportunities to create and capture value that,
in turn, have affected innovative activity and the development
direction of the railway system. As a senior manager within
Railtrack noted ‘These high [delay] penalties give a business
case for innovation to reduce the occurrence of delays’.
Delay penalties were a way of connecting a firm’s punctuality
performance to its profit, and the introduction of compen-
sation for infrastructure possessions placed a price on infra-
structure availability. These new financial mechanisms emerged
in response to the additional coordination requirements
created by the newly introduced operational structure: they put
a price on delay and infrastructure availability for each oper-
ational organisation and this provided an incentive to improve
punctuality, reduce delays and reduce possession time. This
triggered development activity to capture more value and a
series of (process) innovations to improve overall system
performance.
2.3.2 Gathering information on the network
Following privatisation, new challenges emerged related to the
product acceptance processes needed to ensure that new or
altered additions to the system are compatible with, and safe
to be connected to, the existing system. Examples of related
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Figure 5. Maintenance and delay entries within total system
knowledge development projects in the three phases of
development activity
British 
Rail
1989 1992 1997 2001 2005
Newly
privatised 
Network
Rail and SRA 
PrivatisationPre-
privatisation
Data sample
Figure 4. Samples of development activity. The figure shows the
three sample periods on the timeline of phases from Figure 1
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developments captured in the post-privatisation data sample
include
& the changed structure of system review panels within the
product acceptance process
& the creation of a database (parts and drawings system 2000
(PADS 2000)) for products accepted onto the network
& changes to access conditions and group standard to reflect
a new traction and rolling stock acceptance process.
A key element of this challenge was availability of information
on the shape and state of the network. Much of the local infra-
structure knowledge held within British Rail, and the ability to
build upon previous designs and practices, fell outside
Railtrack at privatisation. Gourvish (2002: p. 402) highlights
Railtrack’s specific decision not to incorporate the previous
level of engineering expertise held within British Rail and to
function as ‘an access, capacity management, and sales organ-
isation…’. An interview with a senior industry professional
formerly within Railtrack highlights one consequence.
Initially Railtrack did not have the information about the infra-
structure or its requirements needed to make decisions about the
safety of changes for incoming rolling stock.
Interviews and archive material reveal post-privatisation devel-
opments in measuring and assessment equipment such as
LaserRail’s infrastructure measurement equipment and Amey’s
proposed development of a track recording train and the
development of an ultrasonic rail-flaw detection cart. The new
delay and possession costs discussed earlier will have influ-
enced these developments, but they were also a response to
the need for new knowledge to operate and change the more
organisationally fragmented system that emerged after
privatisation.
The need for new knowledge about the installed infrastructure
system after privatisation can be seen by changes in product
acceptance processes. In the Network Rail and SRA phase,
Network Rail had to learn about its network and engaged in a
range of measurement and recording activities, including the
creation of a national asset management database. For
example, in 2003, Network Rail contracted Omnicom to apply
its system to generate a visual and positional record of
infrastructure.
In this privatised system, additional value can be created by
the infrastructure owner by collecting and processing infor-
mation about the state of the network. With the removal of
much local maintenance and specialised engineering knowl-
edge from the infrastructure owner, the need for this infor-
mation was introduced with privatisation; the new technical
knowledge required to generate this information would not
have been seen as essential under the previous British Rail
structure. In the Network Rail and SRA phase, contracts are
placed with industry suppliers to run measurement trains and
generate databases containing measurement data on the state
of the network.
These new opportunities for value creation emerged from the
new organisational structure that was created at privatisation.
New ventures (e.g. LaserRail) and new areas of expertise were
built up within existing firms to create and capture value from
infrastructure information. In this case, the locations of oppor-
tunities to create value in the industry changed at privatisation
and both innovation activity and ways to capture value from
its results have been created in response.
2.4 Discussion: privatisation and development
in the UK railway system
The changes in innovation-related activity following privatisa-
tion of the railway system highlight how policy decisions that
change organisational structure and governance can influence
the form of the socio-technical system being developed. By
looking at business models and how opportunities for value
creation and capture are altered by structural changes, it is
possible to understand better the connections between the
structural decisions made as part of privatisation (which were
intended to shape the operation of the industry) and the sub-
sequent development trajectory for the railway system that was
generated after privatisation.
Changes regarding track access and reliability, discussed pre-
viously, highlight that the introduction of delay penalties and
track access charges to coordinate operation was effective in
creating a way for firms to capture value from improvements in
punctuality and reliability. However, thinking in business
model terms also highlights that there can be cost and capa-
bility barriers to sufficiently coordinating knowledge and capa-
bilities, held in different organisations, to create value to
respond to opportunities to capture value.
Furthermore, assisting coordination within the restructured
industry has itself become a source of value. The developments
linked to information generation discussed earlier show a new
business opportunity created in the sector and the innovation
activity analysis discussed in Section 2.3 shows that organis-
ations have responded by finding new ways to create and
capture this value (i.e. by developing new business models
along with new technology).
3. Conclusions
The experiences of the UK railway system after privatisation
suggest the need for better understanding of how firms will
respond to changes in regulation and organisational structures.
The structural changes at privatisation were focused upon
introducing competition to, and driving efficiencies within,
system operation; the organisational processes and knowledge
bases required for innovation were not addressed. Business
models focus on how firms capture as well as create value,
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which can help explain the location of innovative activity and
how it develops.
The history of the restructuring of the railway system shows
that reform cannot be implemented in a clean switch from old
to new, but that policy changes initiate further alterations as
organisations respond. Over time, the mechanisms of value
creation and value capture interact to change the nature of
market failures and policy needs for infrastructure systems.
For the future development of transportation infrastructure
sectors, coordination, rather than ownership, is the key (and
overlooked) issue. Competition is only one element of this – it
can produce incentives for innovation by private firms but, for
the system’s development to respond to incentives, organis-
ations with the appropriate capabilities to generate innovations
need to be able to capture value from innovation activity.
More recent initiatives in UK railways, such as the Rail
Technical Strategy and programmes to encourage innovation,
represent attempts to generate opportunities for organisations
to capture value from innovation. Despite the costs to create
and maintain this additional layer of coordination, it is necess-
ary in a system where business models do not fit together to
enable action upon system-level interests. The business model
approach presented in this paper can be used alongside existing
models for system analysis to guide policy and management
decision-making.
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WHAT DO YOU THINK?
To discuss this paper, please email up to 500 words to the
editor at journals@ice.org.uk. Your contribution will be
forwarded to the author(s) for a reply and, if considered
appropriate by the editorial panel, will be published as
discussion in a future issue of the journal.
Proceedings journals rely entirely on contributions sent in
by civil engineering professionals, academics and stu-
dents. Papers should be 2000–5000 words long (briefing
papers should be 1000–2000 words long), with adequate
illustrations and references. You can submit your paper
online via www.icevirtuallibrary.com/content/journals,
where you will also find detailed author guidelines.
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